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REEMERGENCE OF THE CHARTER APPLICATION
DEBATE: ISSUES FOR THE SUPREME COURT IN
ELDRIDGE AND VRIEND
RICHARD FADERt

With the Supreme Court poised to hear the Eldridge and Vriend cases, and
the lack of academic and individual consensus on the effectiveness of the
government actor test, it appears that we are entering round two of the
Charter application debate. The author contends that the threshold approach
should be scrapped in favour of a rights-based analysis, which defines the
Charter's scope within the context of the right or fteedom in question.
Attention is also given to similar issues being examined by the South Aftican
Constitutional Court.
Considr!rant que la Cour supreme du Canada est prete a entendre l'arret
Eldridge et Vriend et considerant le manque d'accord academique et
individuel concernant l'efficacite de !'examen des acteurs gouvernementaux, if
semblerait que nous sommes a l'aube de la deuxieme ronde des debats sur
l'applicabilite de la Charte. L 'auteur soutient que !'analyse fandee sur !es
droits, selon laquelle la portee de la Charte est definie par le droit ou la
liberte en question, doit prendre place a l'approche d'analyse fandee sur un
seuil L 'auteur porte aussi attention a la faron dont ces memes questions sont
traitees par la Cour Constitutionelle de l'Aftique du Sud.

I. INTRODUCTION
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 came into force on
April 17, 1982. It has been described as an "unremitting protection
of individual rights and liberties," 2 and a protector of "a complex of

t B.A. (Saint Mary's), LLB. (Dalhousie), LL.M. anticipated 1997 (Dalhousie). I
would like to thank Professor Dianne Pothier for her helpful comments and my
colleague Phillip Lupul for his suggestions on an earlier draft.
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11 [hereinafter Charter].
2 Hunterv. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 155.
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interacting values, each more or less fundamental to the free and
democratic society that is Canada." 3 It has also been described as "a
flawed exercise, yielding only limited and imperfect results,"4 "a
regressive instrument more likely to undermine than to advance the
interests of ... Canadians,"5 and "an invitation [for the courts] to
exercise enormous political power." 6 More astutely, however, it has
been called "a balancing of competing values," 7 and "a particular
form of political struggle." 8 The conflict to which Professors
MacKay and Fudge refer is the natural corollary to defining, in an
adversarial setting, 9 rights and freedoms such as religion, speech,
and equality. 10 Thus, where there are winners and losers, and the
commodity being fought for is rights and freedoms, inevitably the
system will produce conflict. 11
This clash of human interests in Charter litigation has had
significant political consequences. 12 Despite the court's immediate

R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 136.
E. McWhinney, Canada and the Constitution 1979-1982 (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1982) at 113.
5 A. Petter, "Immaculate Deception: The Charter's Hidden Agenda" (1987) 45
Advocate 857 at 857.
6 D. Frum, "Who's Running This Country Anyway?" Saturday Night (October
1988) 56 at 58.
7 W. MacKay, "Judging and Equality: For Whom Does the Charter Toll?" in C.
Boyle et al., eds., Charterwatch: Reflections on Equality (Toronto: Carswell, 1986)
35 at 93.
8 J. Fudge, "The Public/Private Distinction: The Possibilities of and the Limits
to the Use of Litigation to Further Feminist Struggles" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 485 at 551.
9 See Edmonton journalv. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 at
1353-1354, where Wilson J. wrote, "Nor should one, it seems to me, balance a
private interest, i.e. litigant x's interest in his privacy against a public one, the
public's interest in an open court process. Both interests must be seen as public
interests, in this case the public interest in protecting the privacy of litigants
generally in matrimonial cases against the public interest in an open court process."
lO See Charter, supra note 1, ss. 2(a), 2(b), 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15.
11 See generally A. Petter, "The Politics of the Charter' (1986) 8 Supreme Court
L.R. 473 at 474: "Rights are not commodities that can be given away; they are
entitlements governing the relationships among people within a community. The
extent to which one person's rights and entitlements are expanded is the extent to
which the rights and entitlements of others are contracted."
12 E.g. from 1982-1992 the Charter was used to strike down 41 statutes. For a
good analysis of the court's impact in the first decade of the Charter, see F. Morton,
P. Russell, & T. Riddell, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A
3
4
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acceptance of its role as umpire to these conflicts, and acceptance of
the broad scope of the Charter, 13 there is still limited academic and
judicial discomfort with the political role of the court. 14 While it is
clear to most that this role is here to stay, it is not clear how
successful competing forces will be in their prospective battles on
this judicial landscape. One area where the confrontation has been
most heated, 15 and the focus of this paper, is Charter application.
In the context of this study, Charter application can be
conceptualized as the judicial method of defining the scope or
breadth of the Charter's reach. It becomes apparent, even to the
casual reader, that this threshold is of fundamental importance in
Charter litigation. In the political battleground over human rights,
values and freedoms, this is the high-ground, where amplification
of rights is to be won or lost.
The significance of this threshold is not lost on those who study
law as a discipline, nor those who engage in the process of defining
rights and freedoms in Canada. 16 The range of opinion on this
Descriptive Analysis of the First Decade, 1982-1992" (1994-95) 5 N.J.C.L. 1. For
an example of the highly politically charged nature of some Charter decisions, see
generally R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, where restrictions on abortion
were held to be unconstitutional, violating Charter protections under section 7.
l3 See especially R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 [hereinafter Big
M].
14 See generally F. Morton, "Canada's Judge Borl<: Has the Counter-Revolution
Begun?" (1996) 7 Constitutional Forum 121. Morton speaks of the long-term
growth of judicial activism and the need for judicial self-restraint. Morton is
analyzing the case of Vriendv. Alberta (1996), 132 D.L.R. (4th) 595, in.fa note 16,
where Justice McClung, of the Alberta Court of Appeal, noted at page 614, "We
cannot look on with indifference and allow the superior courts of this country to
descend into collegial bodies that meet regularly to promulgate 'desirable
legislation'."
l5 For an example of this, compare the wildly different interpretations/ critiques
given by the following authors over the issue of Charter application: D. Gibson,
"The Charter of Rights and the Private Sector" (1982-83) 12 Man. L.J. 213,
arguing the Charter should apply to both the pubic and private sectors; P. Hogg,
"The Dolphin Delivery Case: The Application of the Charter to Private Action"
(1987) 51 Sask. L. Rev. 27 4, arguing the Charter only applies to the public sector;
and A. Hutchinson & A. Petter, "Private Rights/Public Wrongs The Liberal Lie of
the Charter' (1988) 38 U.T.L.J. 278, arguing that the Charter is a political weapon
rooted in the dominant liberal democratic state with the inherent bias of protecting
and perpetuating this oppressive mode of governance.
16 See the recent round of debate in: M. Carter, "Non-Statutory Criminal Law
and the Charw: The Application of the Swain Approach in R. v. Daviaulf' (1995)
59(2) Sask. L. Rev. 241; D. Pothier, "The Sounds of Silence: Charter Application
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subject 17 would probably shock the average person.
some clues on the breadth of this document, they
drawn to the marginal note 18 "Application of
inevitably to subsection 32(1) which rests beside it.
is as follows,

In searching for
would likely be
Charter," and
That subsection

32. (1) This Charter applies
(a)to the Parliament and government of Canada in
respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament
including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and
Northwest Territories; and
(b)to the legislature and government of each province in
respect of all matters within the authority of the
legislature of each province.

When considering the range of opinion, a layperson might point
out that the wording of section 32(1) is clear. He or she might
conclude that those arguing for an expanded scope to the Charter
are reading tea-leaves, not the constitution.
Given the recent round of Charter application cases, 19 and the
fact that the Supreme Court is reconsidering this issue, the time is
ripe to address the following questions: What can we learn from the
variance of opinion on this vitally important question? Is the
meaning of section 32(1) clear? We need to recognize the
magnitude of political forces at work and ask: (a) are arguments to
When the Legislature Declines to Speak" (1996) 7 Constitutional Forum 113; P.
Godin, "Anton Piller Orders in an Age of Scepticism: Charter Application and
Other Safeguards for Judicially Ordered Searches" (Winter 1996) 54 U.T. Fae. L.
Rev. 107. See also recent judicial comment in: Vriendv. Alberta (1996), 132 D.L.R.
(4th) 595 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter Vriend]; leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted
October 3, 1996; Hillv. Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 [hereinafter
Eldridgev. British Columbia (Attorney General) (1995), 7 B.C.L.R. (3d) 156
(C.A.) [hereinafter Eldridge]; leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted May 9, 1996;
Dagenaisv. C.B.C., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 [hereinafter Dagenais].
17 Supra note 15.
18 Such reliance would certainly be consistent with the importance the S.C.C.
placed on marginal notes in R. v. Wigglesworth, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541 at 556-558,
where Wilson J. for the majority wrote, "The marginal note to s.11 seems to
support this interpretation of the section .... The case for their utilization as aids to
statutory interpretation is accordingly weaker. I believe, however, that the
distinction can be adequately recognized by the degree of weight attached to them."
19 Supra note 16, and for a general discussion, see Part Three of this paper.
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expand the breadth of the Charter merely the political seduction of
the law, 20 or (b) is it time to give full meaning and breadth to the
Charter? 21 Is our understanding of the history, text and nature of
our constitution sufficient to answer these questions? Do we need to
go deeper than the drafters of the constitution in explicitly defining
the structure of government we wish to have? In reading the
constitution as the Supreme Court of Canada has done up until
now, is it merely gazing at tea-leaves or are arguments which call
instead for an expanded Charter the rantings of alienated political
forces? If change is needed, is it of a radical nature or can it occur
within the framework of our existing traditions and norms?
These questions are still in dispute, despite significant academic
and judicial writing on the subject. The following is an attempt to
address some of these questions. It is important to analyze the
different perspectives in an attempt to make sense of the forces at
work and to try and predict where discussion is likely to lead in the
future.
Toward these ends the paper will begin, in Part Two, by
examining the wide range of academic writing and judicial opinion
on this subject. This is essential, both for understanding the
foundational arguments that current law is built upon, and for
highlighting the range of opinion on the various points of
controversy. The areas addressed are: historical analysis, textual
construction, the nature and function of constitutional documents,
and the floodgates/individual autonomy argument.
Part Three will analyze the current debate over the scope of the
Charter. The focus will be on the functionality of the test itself,
rather than analysis of why the test developed as it did. The general
thrust is that we are entering a new round of academic debate, and
judicial reconsideration, in this area of constitutional jurisprudence.

20

To borrow from United States constitutional scholar, former U.S. Court of
Appeals Judge, Robert Bork, who uses this phrase in the title of his text The
Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (New York: Simon &
Schuster Inc., 1990).
,
21 The full-breadth argument has been championed by D. Gibson, supra note 15
and "Distinguishing the Governors from the Governed: The Meaning of
'Government' Under Section 32(1) of the Charter' (1983) 13 Man. L.J. 505.
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In Part Four, having exposed the serious weaknesses of the
government actors test, 22 the paper will question where the Court
should go from here. Should Canada follow the United States
down the well-worn road of doctrinal confusion? Or, as an
alternative, should we approach the issue with a rights-based
methodology, where the scope of the Charter is determined within
the context of the right or freedom in question, rather than through
the threshold test?
In Part Five, the paper engages in an analysis of a recent case out
of the South African Constitutional Court, raising issues and
arguments similar to those being considered in Canada. In
conclusion, it will attempt to organize the issues which will face the
Supreme Court of Canada in the Eldridge and Vriend cases, as well
as those which will likely continue to emerge over time. In the
author's opinion, it is not a coincidence that we are back in the
middle of this debate: we need a new approach to this
constitutional issue. The Court has the choice to either reverse the
heavily criticized jurisprudence in this area or to continue building
further on inadequate case law.

II. ANALYSIS OF THE FOUR PILLARS
The purpose of this Part is to develop an understanding of the
arguments relied on by a majority of Canadian academics and
judges in determining the scope of the Charter, while at the same
time highlighting arguments to the contrary. By showing the
tension that exists on both sides of the debate, and examining each,
it becomes clear that analysis in this area generally starts with a
conclusion and flows into a search for supporting evidence.
As will be discussed in Part Four, the undercurrent of various
opinions on the application of the Charter is political, and depends
upon one's view or conception of the proper mode of governance. 2 3

22 See generally G. Crann, "How Far Does the Charter Reach? A Theoretical
Review of the s.32(1) Debate and Canada's Emerging 'Government Action'
Doctrine" (1988-89) 47 U.T. Fae. L. Rev. 156.
2 3 For example, P. Hogg, arguably Canada's most eminent constitutional
scholar, in his text Constitutional Law of Canada, 3rd ed. (Supplemented)
(Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at 34-22 states, "[I]f a private abuse exists, the democratic
political process can drive the legislative bodies to produce laws that are needed to
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More specifically, these are basic, often unarticulated, views about
the legislature, the electorate and the courts. Such ideological
perspectives are the true engine of this process.
The goal of the following exercise, in part, is to show how
eminent constitutional scholars can disagree on history, grammar,
the nature of constitutions, and the potential effects of a wider
Charter breadth. These are issues the layperson might consider to
be objectively verifiable. The following are the key issues cited by
the majority of Canadian judges and scholars to "conclude" that
the Charter only applies to government (or the "public" sector). 24
1. Historical arguments

To varying degrees, those who argue for the narrow scope of the
Charter share a conception of the role of its framers, which is
provide a remedy." This ringing affirmation of the state of Canadian democracy is
not shared by D. Gibson. In discussing the scope of the Charter, Gibson makes
reference to the legislative override to (some) Charter rights under section 33. This
point is raised not to draw us into an analysis of section 33 (which does have the
potential to impact the breadth of the Charter) but to highlight Gibson's view of
Canadian democracy and the Court's role in it. Gibson's affirmation of judicial
review in favour of unadulterated democracy is reflected in The Law ofthe Charter:
General Principles, (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 126: "With respect to rights
(language rights, for example), that are not subject to being overridden, judges may
proceed with equal confidence, knowing that the intensely democratic negotiations
that produced section 33 confirmed the need for those rights to be protected by
unqualified judicial review." The conclusions drawn by these two authors over the
scope of the Charter flow, in large part, from their individual views of democracy
rather than from logical conclusions drawn from the "arguments" highlighted in
this chapter.
24 This notion of public/private is discussed in Part Four. It should be noted that
the true debate is not over the public/private issue because, although a component,
to focus on this vague distinction tends to take one's attention away from the actors
in the process. It is useful to remind ourselves that we are in the political
battleground over rights and freedoms, not in a shopping centre where rights and
freedoms can be purchased as commodities from the public sector shelves. This
vague public/private notion, although inevitably creeping into the debate, should
not be allowed to dominate the focus and thereby mystify the process. See D.
Pothier, Crossing the Lines in Dolphin Delivery: Thoughts on the Parameters of
Charter Application (Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University, 1987) [unpublished]
reprinted in Public Law Course Materials 1993-1994 (Vol. 2) (Dalhousie
University) 5-127 at 5-130: "All of this assumes, of course, that there is a clear
distinction between public and private, and that the world can be divided into neat
little boxes .... I would not say that the public/private distinction has no content,
but I see it as a continuum (or a series of continua) rather than a dichotomy.... "
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sometimes referred to as "original understanding." 25 Basically, the
position is that the purpose or intent of a section, or group of
sections, can be found by historical analysis and therefore should
drive the current understanding and application of that section.
This, it seems logical, would be a more arguable position in Canada
than the United States, since the Charter is of fairly recent origin,
with a great wealth of material documenting it. 26
There is a common thread which runs through the historical
analysis of those who prefer a narrow scope to the Charter. Rather
than attempting to compile a collective understanding of the
members of the Parliament which passed the Constitution Act,
1982, focus is given to comments made by the Minister of Justice,
Deputy Minister and senior Department of Justice lawyers before a
Parliamentary Special Joint Committee on the Constitution.
Speaking in public/private terms, all of these actors stated that the
Charter was to apply only as between the "individual" and the
"government." For example, on January 15, 1981, R. Tasse, Q.C.,
the Deputy Minister of Justice, speaking before the Committee
stated, "we do not see these rights or these proscriptions of the
Charter to have application in terms of a relationship between
individuals. "27

25

This term is more prevalent in the United States literature. The view, in its
most strict form, is put forth by Robert Bork. He describes U.S. society as a liberal
democracy in which the court's authority -judicial review- should be approached
with great caution. The theory is that, where the intention of drafters of the
constitution is not clear, there is no authority for a judge to act. Any changes
(growth) to the constitution must come by way of amendment, supra note 20. It is
interesting to note that the U.S. Bill of Rights was passed in 1791, yet the claim to
understand the original intent is still made. Debate on this method of interpretation
continues (see e.g., J. Rakove, "The Original Intent of Original Understanding"
(1996) 13 Constitutional Commentary 159).
26 For instance, see McWhinney, supra note 4; J. Whyte, "Is the Private Sector
Affected by the Charter?" in L. Smith et al., eds., Righting the Balance: Canada's
New Equality Rights (Saskatoon: Canadian Human Rights Reporter, 1986) 145.
27 Minutes of Special joint Committee on the Constitution of Canada, January 15,
1989, 38:49.

CHARTER APPLICATION DEBATE

195

What authors like Peter Hogg28 and Katherine Swinton29 glean
from such statements is the conclusion that there was a clear
legislative intent. Added to this are arguments based on a proposed
early draft, which was as follows:
29. (1) to the Parliament and government of Canada and
to all matters within the authority of Parliament
including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and
Northwest Territories.3°

When compared to the current text, 31 one sees that the words
"and to all matters within" were changed to "in respect of all
matters within." J. D. Whyte points out that the change was made
by the legislative drafters in order to avoid ambiguity and clearly
limit the scope to the public sector.3 2
From these facts, the conclusion is drawn that there was a clear
subjective legislative intent. At first blush, this line of argument
appears convincing. The layperson would likely be satisfied with
this seemingly overwhelming historical account. In addition to
academic support, the Supreme Court of Canada has relied, in part,
on this argument. In the landmark case of Retail, Wholesale and
Department Store Union v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd. the Court said of
the Charter, "it was intended to restrain government action and to
protect the individual. It was not intended ... to be applied in
private litigation."33 It can be argued that the Court was not relying
on a historical argument when it made these comments, since sparse
attention was paid to the actual history (other than the references to
"intent"). However, the Court's reliance on the historical record was
made more clear in McKinney v. University of Guelph where the
Court wrote, "[t]he exclusion of private activity from the Charter
was not the result of happenstance. It was a deliberate choice which
28 Supra note 15.
29

"Application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Ss. 30, 31, 32)"
in W. Tarnopolsky and G. Brandoin, eds., The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms: A Commentary (Toronto: Carswell, 1982) 41at41.
30 As can be seen in McWhinney, supra note 4 at 145.
31 See text following note 18.
32 Supra note 26.
33 [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 at 593 [hereinafter Dolphin Delivery]. This case was the
Supreme Court of Canada's first attempt to define the scope of the Charter. It
remains the most exhaustive and authoritative attempt by the Court to give reasons
for creating the current Charter application test.
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must be respected." 34 This conclusion, however, was made without
much in the way of an explicit historical review. Nonetheless, it was
a determinative factor in the outcome. The problem of sparse
attention being paid to actual history was compounded by the
Court, in subsequent cases, when it simply cited these two earlier
cases as authority for the "historical intent." 35
Despite these arguments, a flurry of challenges from the
"expansionist camp" (authors promoting a wider application of
Charter) ensued. These authors argued that the history was not
clear and that no single theme can emanate from the "historical"
analysis.36 More fundamentally, they argued that the Charter
(specifically section 32) was a political compromise, 37 with forces on
both sides of the issue failing to reach any solid conclusion or
vision, 38 and as such, there was no subjective consensus.
Dale Gibson challenges the historical arguments made in favour
of the narrow approach. First, he points out that the constitution
was passed by a legislative assembly, and therefore, the Minister of
Justice cannot be seen as the authority for the subjective intent of
the entire House.39 He points out that there was no attempt to
canvass the legislature and determine who voted for what. 40 Also, he

34
35

[1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 at 262 [hereinafter McKinney].
For example, Stojfman v. Vancouver General Hospital, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 483
[hereinafter Stojfman].
3 6 See generally D. Buckingham, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms and Private Action: Applying the Purposive Approach" (1986) 51 Sask. L.
Rev. 105.
37 See R. Hawkins & R. Martin, "Democracy and Bertha Wilson" (1995) 41
McGill L.J. 1 at 29, " ... the Charter was a typically Canadian compromise, a deal
struck after a vety politicized negotiation in which it was decided that rights would
be protected by the Constitution .... " The article goes on in footnote 125 to quote
from The Ottawa Citizen, speaking about the Federal-Provincial Conference of
First Ministers on the Constitution, November 2-5, 1981, "When future
chroniclers of Canada's constitution examine the events of this week, they will
likely conclude that the first ministers haggled like merchants in a bazaar until they
made a deal that nobody could claim was a victory" ("History in the Bazaar" The
Ottawa Citizen (6 November 1981) 8).
38 Gibson, supra note 15 at 213.
39 Gibson, supra note 23 at 115.
40 This critique is on all fours with basic notions of statutory interpretation. For
instance, in Sir R. Cross,]. Bell, & Sir G. Engle., Statutory Interpretation, 3rd ed.
(London: Butterworths, 1995) at 24, it is observed," ... the phrase cannot mean the
intention of the majority who voted for the statute as this will almost certainly have
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points out that the change in drafts was made "without political
instructions," 41 implying that this was not a matter of politically
contested debate. Because of this, it is impossible to glean any
statutory intent from it. In addition, the Supreme Court of
Canada, in Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act,
R.S.B.C. 1979, c.288, went out of its way to say the Court was not
bound by the drafters' intent. 42
What this highlights is how the two sides of the "bigger picture
debate" frame the issues and conduct their historical analysis. The
approaches are driven by an end result, and are not good historical
exercises. In fact, Robin Elliot and Robert Grant, who themselves
argue "practical" reasons (ie., limited judicial resources) for
excluding the breadth of the Charter from including the private
sector, concede that the historical debate bears no fruit. 43
Thus, in the first of the four main arguments, the point of
departure tends to be a conclusion, with the facts and analysis
framed in a manner to bolster that conclusion. Specifically, in the
case of the Supreme Court of Canada, no attempt was made to
back up conclusions drawn about the subjective intent of the
drafters.
2. Textual Arguments

While the search for subjective legislative intent is not a well
established tenet of Canadian jurisprudence, textual analysis of a
document in order to determine the objective intent of the

been constituted by different persons at different stages of the passage of the Bill and,
in any event, it would be rash to assume that all those who vote for it have the same
intentions with regard to a particular piece of legislation." Similar points are raised
by E. Drieger, Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at
106.
4l Gibson, supra note 23 at 115.
42 (1986), 24 D.L.R. 536 at 554 where Lamer]. wrote, "Moreover the simple
fact remains that the Charter is not the product of a few individual public servants,
however distinguished .... How can one say with any confidence that within this
enormous multiplicity of actors, without forgetting the role of the provinces, the
comments of a few federal civil servants can in any way be determinative?"
4 3 R. Elliot & R. Grant, "The Charter's Application in Private Litigation"
(1988-89) 23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 459 at 463, "The prevailing wisdom, however, is that
the Charter does not reach some private actions ... an appeal is invariably made to
the intention of the drafters ... these ... are often advanced with little conviction
and are used to buttress conclusions reached for other reasons."
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legislature certainly is. 44 In fact, the law on Charter application, as it
presently exists in Canada, is based solidly on the textual argument.
This approach was relied on extensively in the landmark case of
Dolphin Delivery. In Canadian jurisprudence, the textual approach
is the most accepted and least controversial, as it fits most easily
with our understanding of our liberal democratic system of
government.
By interpreting the words of the Charter, the attempt is to glean
the most accurate picture of the "legislative intent." 4 5 In theory, this
limits judicial re-construction and avoids a fictional attempt to
subjectively determine the actual "intent" of the legislature. Because
of its importance, the paper will examine the current textual
arguments put forth by both the Supreme Court of Canada and
those academics who, like the Court, favour a narrow application of
the Charter.
The Supreme Court of Canada, in its first pronouncement on
the scope of the Charter, 46 characterized the debate within the
parameters of section 32. That is, the Court ruled that section 32 is
a conclusive statement on the breadth of the Charter. The same
observation has been made by Peter Hogg47 and other academics. 48
As noted in part one of this paper, the marginal note "Application
of Charter" does add weight to the proposition that section 32 is
the touchstone provision for Charter application.
What arguments then are drawn from section 32 to reinforce
the position that the Charter should only apply against government
action (ie., classical liberalism)? The layperson would likely observe
that section 32, 4 9 while expressly including "Parliament,"
"government" and "in respect of all matters within the authority
44 See Cross, supra note 40 at 25, where it is noted that, "the intention to be
attributed to the legislature is to be determined from the objective words used,
rather than from any subjective intentions which were not expressed in the text."
45 See Lord Reid, in Black-Clawson International Ltd. v. Papierwerke WaldhofAschaffenburg A. G., [1975) A. C. 591 at 613, where he said, "We often say that we are
looking for the intention of Parliament, but that is not quite accurate. We are
seeking the meaning of the words which Parliament used. We are seeking not what
Parliament meant but the true meaning of what they said."
46 Dolphin Delivery, supra note 33.
47 Hogg, supra note 23 at 34-20.2.
48 See generally A. Mclellan & B. Elman, ''To Whom Does the Charter Apply?
Some Recent Cases on Section 32" (1985-86) 24 Alta. L. Rev. 361.
49 See text following note 18.
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of," does not mention private actors. Those judges and academics
in favour of a narrow scope to the Charter are quick to point out the
long-standing principle of interpretation known as expressio unius est
exclusio alterius (inclusion of one implies the exclusion of another).
Thus, if the Parliament (which passed the constitution) wanted to
include the private sector, it would have done so expressly.so The
argument is that the public sector is included, and the private is
excluded, because the section is "clear."
The textual argument is sometimes made in terms of section 1
of the Charter.5 1 The argument is that "prescribed by law" is a
qualifier to all enumerated rights. As such, the text of this section
indicates that the rights so protected are protected only against
government action.5 2 Thus the qualifier only speaks to those
limitations prescribed by law.53
Considering the weight of these arguments, does it not seem
clear from the text of section 32 and section 1 that the Charter was
only intended to apply against government action? Why do some
academics persist in claiming that nothing conclusive can be drawn
from such an analysis of the text?5 4 Who are these radicals who
claim the text is not clear, and more importantly, can they read?
When examining the textual arguments from the expansionist
camp, one discovers that they do not seem all that radical, and that
they do flow from a textual analysis of the Charter. The most
obvious starting point is to analyze criticism of the inductive
reasoning used to limit the application debate to section 32.
Dale Gibson puts forth a cogent argument 55 regarding the
purpose of section 32. His argument is that the inclusion of
so McKinney, supra note 34 at 261; Laforest J. speaking of section 32(1),
concludes, "These words give a strong message that the Charter is confined to
government action."
5l Section 1. states: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees
the rights and freedoms set out in its subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."
5Z This raises the question, "What laws are proponents of this argument referring
to?" Section 32(1) only excludes the common law where there is no government
actor. Dolphin Delivery, supra note 33, allows a range of law to be challenged
which does not fit within the section 1 "prescribed by law" test. This inconsistency
shows the weakness of this argument, infta note 64.
53 See Mclellan & Elman, supra note 48 at 363.
54 See generally Elliot & Grant, supra note 43; Buckingham, supra note 36.
55 Supra note 15.
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"Parliament" and "government" should not lead one to the expressio
unius est exclusio alterius doctrine, but should give way to ex
abundante cautela. That is, inclusion of the public sector was needed
to refute the principle of statutory interpretation that legislation
does not apply to the Crown, except for explicit reference or
necessary implication. Conversely, it is assumed to apply to all
others.56
Flowing out of this, commentators attempt to apply the
Supreme Court of Canada's own "purposive approach" to Charter
application, in order to determine the proper scope of the Charter
itself.57 Donald Buckingham refers to Big M., where the Supreme
Court held that the purpose of a section is "ought by reference to
the character and larger objects of the Charter." Robert Howse also
relies on this purposive approach. 58 Howse points out that there is
no reason to limit the analysis to section 32, noting that in Dolphin
Delivery the Court did not give reasons for such a restrictive
approach. The idea that the Charter must be read as a whole in
order to achieve the objective meaning of any one section drives this
argument. Dale Gibson highlights some of the various sections of
the Charter which have a "ring" that would seem broader than that
accorded to section 32. 59 Some sections used as examples are:
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms ...
12. Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any
cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.

56

Ibid. at 214. This position is shared by M. Manning, Rights, Freedoms and the
Courts: A Practical Analysis of the Constitution Act, 1982 (Toronto: EdwardMontgomery, 1983); and M. Doody, "Freedom of the Press, The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and a New Category of Qualified Privilege"
(1983) 61 Can. Bar Rev. 124. Wilson J., in McKinney, supra note 34, challenged this
position, at 335: "I do not find this line of reasoning persuasive since it seems to me
obvious that one of the basic purposes of a constitutional document like the Charter
is to bind the Crown. I do not believe therefore that in absence of s.32(1) it would
have been open to the Court to apply ordinary principles of statutory interpretation
when construing the Charter and thereby conclude that the Crown was not bound
by its provisions."
57 See generally Buckingham, supra note 36.
5 8 R. Howse, "Dolphin Delivery: The Supreme Court and the Public/Private
Distinction in Canadian Constitutional Law" (1988) 46 U.T. Fae. L. Rev. 248.
59 Supra note 15.
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15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law
and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of
the law without discrimination and, in particular, without
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin,
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical
disability. 60

Indeed, it seems strange that the Court would adopt such a narrow
approach, when this mode of interpretation is so inconsistent with
other statements. 61
Authors in the expansionist camp come to the same conclusion,
on the textual argument, that any attempt to glean an objective
purpose or clear meaning from section 32(1) is pure fiction. In fact,
even Peter Hogg states that the language of section 32(1) is
"admittedly ambiguous," 62 going on to ground his argument in
constitutional history and legal theory.
The most convincing and articulate characterization of the state
of this section is given by Dale Gibson. He points out that since this
was a political compromise section, it is "deliberately ambiguous:"

60

Reference is also made to s.52(1):

52. (1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of
Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or
effect.
It is argued that since the Charter is the supreme law of the land, it should apply
to both the public sector (law) and the private sector (law). See Doody, supra note
56; and Gibson, supra note 23 at 113-114.
61 E.g. R. v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309 at 326, where La Forest for the majority
wrote, " [T]his case exemplifies the rather obvious point that the rights and
freedoms protected by the Charter are not insular and discrete . . .. [E] ach
enunciated right and freedom imbues and informs our understanding of the value
structure sought to be protected by the Charter as a whole and, in particular, of the
content of the other specific rights and freedoms it embodies." This wider ring was
noted, in the section 2(b) context, by the Supreme Court of Canada in Irwin Toy
Ltd. v. Quebec (Procureur General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 where they quoted with
favour Thomas Emerson, "Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment"
(1963) 72 Yale L.J. 877 at 886, "[T]he theory of freedom of expression ... is put
forward as a prescription for attaining a creative, progressive, exciting and
intellectually robust community." In the Canadian context we can use Emerson's
line of argument to the effect that section 32 must be read in light of the other
objects and purposes of the Charter and not as an insular and discrete touchstone in
defining the scope of the Charter.
62 Supra note 15 at 27 4.
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[i]t is equally clear that other parties to the negotiations
were not willing to exclude the private sector
unequivocally; if they had been willing they would have
agreed to state that the Charter applied 'only' to
governmental activities. Given the constitutional and
drafting expertise of those who advised the various
negotiating governments, the omissions of the conclusive
word "only" cannot be regarded as accidental. 63

This keen observation certainly breathes life into the expansionist
camp's argument that the textual argument is incomplete64 because
of the nature of the document itself.
Yet, it should be noted that the current law rests heavily on the
textual argument that section 32 "clearly" excludes application to
the private sector. As such, is the above dialogue a barren exercise in
academic analysis? Hopefully not. As pointed out earlier, 65 and as
will be analyzed in detail in the following Part, there is a new round
of Charter application cases and debate going on. The important
point is that the textual argument has not produced consensus.
Once again we see the same parties on the same side of the "big
picture debate" arguing in favour of their position. With the wide
range of interpretation and the passionate nature of the debate, it is
impossible to conclude that either side is engaged in a purely
objective attempt to determine the meaning of this section. The
point is that these judges and commentators are not looking at tea

Gibson, supra note 15 at213.
Little rebuttal has been given to the section 1 argument, perhaps due to the
relatively weak nature of the position. Yet Elliot & Grant, supra note 43 at 467,
portray section 1 as operating when the limitations on rights or freedoms are
prescribed by law (obviously) but they reject the argument that this, on its own
accord, limits the scope of the Charter. It is noted that if the Charter did apply to
the private sector, the non-application of section 1 "would impose more stringent
conditions on individuals than on government," but this does not speak to the scope
of the Charter. But see Hill, supra note 16, where the Court, in developing the
common law in a manner consistent with the Charter, applied a variation of the
section 1 test; also see B. C. G.E. U. v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1988] 2
S.C.R. 214 [hereinafter B.C.G.E.U.].
65 Supra note 16.
63

64
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leaves, they are looking at an ambiguous document and filling in
the gaps with their own political baggage. 66

3. Nature of Constitutions
Having seen a lack of consensus regarding the textual interpretation
of the Charter, it comes as no surprise that there is no agreement on
the vague and value-laden question: what is the fundamental nature
of a constitution? Comment on this point came early and often in
the life of the Charter. 67 In many cases, it formed the basis for the
conclusion that the Charter does not apply to purely private
action. 68 Both Hogg and Swinton buttress their arguments in this
area on brief statements, with no cited support. They conclude that
"the normal role of a constitution" 69 is to "set out the terms of
relationship between the citizen and the state.... "70
This simple analysis, as noted by Brian Etherington,7 1 was the
basis for Dolphin Delivery, 72 the Supreme Court of Canada's first
look and lasting effort to define the scope of the Charter. The
Court began its analysis from the "orthodox position" that the role
of a constitution is to regulate the individual versus the state.73 Anne
66

This terminology is not used in an attempt to be overly cynical of the process.
Unlike Hutchinson & Petter, supra note 15, it simply makes the point that the
political undercurrent is what drives the debate in this area.
67 See generally B. Etherington, Notes of Cases: Retail, Wholesale and Dept.
Store Union, Local 580v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 818; and J.
Manwarning, "Bringing the Common Law to the Bar of Justice: A Comment on
the Decision in the Case of Dolphin Delivery" (1987) 19 Ott. L. Rev. 413.
68 Hogg, supra note 23 at 34-20.2-20.3; Swinton, supra note 29; and Dolphin
Delivery, supra note 33.
69 Hogg, supra note 23 at 34-20.3.
70 Swinton, supra note 29 at 44.
7! Supra note 67.
72 A similar observation is made by G. Otis, "The Charter, Private Action and the
Supreme Court" (1987) 19 Ott. L. Rev. 71 at 77: "It is submitted that the Supreme
Court of Canada, without necessarily engaging in the lofty exposition of the
Canadian brand of western constitutional philosophy, should at least have given a
broader textual basis to its interpretation of the Charter as a strictly "public law"
instrument."
73 For an analysis of this orthodox view of liberalism/constitutionalism, as well
as an alternative vision, see R. Yalden, "Liberalism and Canadian Constitutional
Law: Tension in an Evolving Vision of Liberty" (1988-89) 47 U.T. Fae. L. Rev. 132
at 148: "To date, the orthodox vision ofliberty has been very much at the forefront
of these decisions .... [I]t remains the dominant vision. . . an approach that embraces
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Mclellan and Bruce Elman, 74 in pre-Dolphin Delivery
jurisprudence, flag a number of cases in which Canadian courts have
expressed the same view of the nature of constitutions. John
Manwarning notes that a majority of Canadian commentators also
accept this orthodox view. He succinctly boils the argument down
by pointing out,
[t]his view is fundamental to classical liberal theory which
was intended to justify the freeing of private economic
activity from pervasive state regulation. 75

The characterization established in Dolphin Delivery was confirmed
by the Supreme Court of Canada in McKinney.7 6
While it is not surprising that the two sides in the Charter
application debate stick to their positions in this vague and
indeterminate area, two things do warrant mentioning. First, the
amount of weight given by current law to this position is not
reflected in the logical weight of the argument itself. Second, the
polarization and high level of emotionally charged writing in this
area reflect the political forces at work. For example, Hogg refers to
the private sector as· "a sphere of the private where the truly bad
stuff goes on." Clearly he is taking a shot at those who believe the
Charter should apply to some forms of the private sector. He then
derides the position of his opponents by noting that "only academic
lawyers really believe in this distinction." 77 He concludes by
reaffirming his commitment to the liberal democratic process.
When one reviews the comments of those Hogg describes as
"academic lawyers," a whirlpool of dissent surrounding this
argument becomes apparent. It is obvious that there is no generally
held consensus on the nature of constitutions, especially when it

the proposition that private spheres of action that need to be protected can be
distinguished from public spheres in which governmental intervention is
justified.... "
74 Supra note 48.
7 5 J. Manwarning, "Bringing the Common Law to the Bar of Justice: A
Comment on the Decision in the Case of Dolphin Delivery' (1987) 19 Ott. L. Rev.
413 at 435.
76 Supra note 34 at 261: "This Court has repeatedly drawn attention to the fact
that the Charter is essentially an instrument for checking the powers of government
over the individual."
77 Hogg, supra note 23 at 34-22.
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comes to the Charter. For example, Robin Elliot and Robert Grant
write,
the Charter does not contain a single vision; it portrays
the state in both positive and negative terms, as an
instrument for progressive change. . . . The Charter
should not therefore be burdened by the preconceived
notions.
While history and tradition should be reflected in
the Charter interpretation, we need not cling
dogmatically to the conventional image of constitutions
just because it is comfortably familiar. [footnotes
excluded]7 8

But, were they asleep in Poli-Sci 100? Were Peter Hogg and
Katherine Swinton wide awake and actively taking notes when the
"clear" and "obvious" nature of constitutions was revealed?
The reader will have to excuse the attempt at humour, but it is a
fallacy that jurisprudence should be built on vague notions of
constitutionalism. This is a weak platform at best. This is not to say
that the position is not well accepted in Canada. Rather, the point is
that the argument is itself without a logical foundation, when used
in the Charter context. Dale Gibson,79 for example, points out that
the individual versus state conception of constitutionalism has never
existed in pure form in either the United States, 80 the United
Kingdom, or Canada. 81 Gibson is supported by Brian Slattery, who
stresses the importance of reading the Charter itself, to determine
its scope. He eschews vague references to other constitutional
documents. He humorously notes that "claims that a particular
horse has five legs [are] settled, not by reading the dictionary
definition of horse, but by counting the legs." 82 Donald
Buckingham 83 suggests that we "count the legs" by taking a

78
79
80
81

82

83

Supra note 43 at 473.
Supra note 15.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), 376 U.S. 254 (U.S.S.C.).
For a recent example of this in Canada, see Hill supra note 16.
B. Slattery, "Legislation" (1985) 63 Can. Bar Rev. 148 at 159.
Supra note 36.

206

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

purposive approach to the analysis. 84 Again, the argument is that to
determine the scope of the Charter, one needs to refer to the
Canadian Charter and not, for example, to the United States Bill of
Rights. Again, however, there is a lack of consensus on this key issue.
Furthermore, at the Supreme Court we again see very little
discussion or analysis before conclusions are drawn.

4. Floodgates-"Individual Autonomy"
The fourth justification on which current law is built is the
"floodgates" argument. However, it is not widely relied upon, even
by academics who favour the narrow application of the Charter.
Yet, it is important to review (and to characterize as one of the four
pillars) because it was so extensively relied upon in Dolphin
Delivery.
Dolphin Delivery is clearly predicated upon the assumption that
application of the Charter to the private sector would be a disaster.
In fact, David Beatty85 posits that paranoia over the private/public
dichotomy led the Court not only to conclude that the Charter
does not apply to purely private action, but also to the roundly
criticized position that courts are not "government" for the
purposes of section 32. 86
The Court drew heavily on an article written by Anne McLellan
and Bruce P. Elman. 87 There, the authors apocalyptically spoke of
the problems Canada would face if the Charter were applied to
purely private action. Peter Hogg picked up on aspects of this (as
did the Supreme Court in McKinnej 8) when he wrote,
This would create an extensive new body of
"constitutional tort law" . . . [t]he existence of these
remedies would vastly expand the role of the courts. The
Charter of Rights, and the judicial review that inescapably
accompanies its prescriptions, would be intolerably
84 Discussed above in the section on "textual arguments," at Part Two, Section 2,
and the discussion on the wording of sections 2, 15 and 51(1), which ring much
broader than the narrow wording of section 32.
8 5 "Constitutional Conceits: The Coercive Authority of Courts" (1987) 37
U.T.L.J. 183.
86 Ibid.; Gibson, supra note 21; Godin, supra note 16; and Hogg, supra note 23 at
34-16.
87 Supra note 48.
88 Supra note 34.
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pervasive, applying to the most intimate relationship.
[footnote excluded] 8 9

It is interesting to note that Robin Elliot and Robert Grant,90 while
sounding the floodgate alarm, are careful to separate it from the
individual autonomy argument (ie., that allowing the Charter into
the purely private sphere of human life would be unbearably
restrictive and an affront to liberty). They first point out that an
individual subject to the Charter would be able to argue privacy as
part of his or her defence (ie., balancing privacy against the right of
another to free expression). Such a position is not available to the
government, operating in the public sector. Second, they state that
in some cases, not applying the Charter could lead to a greater
threat to personal autonomy. They challenge the myth that only
the government threatens personal autonomy by arguing that
similar threats exist in the private sector.9 1
And yet, Elliot and Grant do argue for a limited Charter on the
pure policy position of the floodgates argument. Their concern is
that the wide scope would increase the role of the court at the
expense of our democratic institutions. They point out that, in
addition to the anti-democratic sting, our courts are not equipped
to legislate social policy wholesale.
Brian Slattery92 directly challenges the floodgates argument by
pointing out that the absence of a threshold application test does
not mean that there is no limitation on the scope of the Charter.
Rather than sticking their fingers into the dam to protect against
the rising waters of "private sector" Charter litigation, Slattery and
Dianne Pothier 93 point out that a rights-based analysis would
produce limitations on Charter application. These limits are
developed depending on the particular right in question. For
example:
11. Any person charged with an offence has the right

89

Hogg, supra note 23 at 34-22.

90 Supra note 43.

9I Of course this depends on the circumstances of a given case. This statement is
not meant to imply that the government never threatens personal autonomy, rather
that such a denial of liberty also occurs within the purely private sphere of human
life.
92 Supra note 82.
93 Ibid; and Pothier, supra note 24.
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(d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
according to law in a fair and public hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal [emphasis added];
15. (I) Every individual is equal before and under the law
and has the right to the equal protection and equal
benefit of the law without discrimination and, in
particular, without discrimination based on race ....
[emphasis added]

Should the following rights be applied on the same threshold as
section 2(b)?
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression,
including freedom of the press and other media of
communication; ... [emphasis added]

If so, why? The argument is that these rights dearly have limitations
built in. For instance, section 11 is not going to be used to
guarantee a child who has "allegedly" taken from the cookie jar
without permission, the right to a trial before judge or jury. The
right clearly has a limitation, namely being "charged with an
offence." This line of argument is consistent with the view of
United States constitutional scholar Lawrence Tribe.9 4 How better
to determine the scope of the Charter than in the context of the
specific right in question? Given the range of debate, it is apparent
that there is no significant consensus in this area. 95
It is useful at this point to stop and reflect on what has been
reviewed in this Part. This paper has not been trying to map out the
private/public parameters, necessitated by a test which employs the
term "government" as the threshold.96 Rather, the focus has been on
arguments used as justification for the test itself. Thus, the test in
Dolphin Delivery is distinct from the reasons given for applying
such a test. It is apparent that the lack of consensus on the four
pillars is a primary reason why we are entering the second phase of

94 L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 2nd ed. (Mineola: Foundation Press,
1988) at 1699.
95 Gibson, supra note 15 at 219.
96 Dolphin Delivery, supra note 33. Analysis of this test is conducted in Part Four
of this paper.

CHARTER APPLICATION DEBATE

209

the Charter application debate. What the paper hopes to show is
that without asking the right questions, Canada is likely to pursue
the "100 years of doctrinal confusion" Dale Gibson refers to as the
hallmark of the United States "state-action" doctrine. 97
An attempt has been made to show how each of the four pillars
is the subject of significant dispute, 98 and that none of them
produce an argument which is complete. You might ask, so what? Is
there not enough support by academics and judges to forget about
the lack of logical foundation for the current Charter application
tests? U mil recently, this might have appeared to be the case.
However, as discussed in the following Part, there is a new round of
Charter application arguments and cases ongoing. In many
instances, they are addressing the same questions that were not
resolved in previous decisions. The flaw with the jurisprudence in
this area is that the Supreme Court only argued, in any detail, the
four pillars in two cases, namely: Dolphin Delivery and McKinney.
Despite numerous cases attempting to define and refine the
government actor test, the Supreme Court has yet to fully expound
upon the background reasons for having such a test. There are
cogent academic arguments on both sides of these issues, and yet
only fleeting judicial comment in the two cases mentioned. The
lack of dialogue at the Supreme Court level, and the lack of
consensus among academics, is one of the reasons we are entering
phase two of the Charter application debate. It is essential that the
Court meet these issues directly.
In Gibson's terms, the Supreme Court of Canada has failed to
do the job the drafters of the constitution left to it. Now the Court
is going to have a second chance to explicitly define concepts
central to the make-up of the Canadian state.

III. THE REEMERGENCE OF THE DEBATE
The law on Charter application is not only confusing
andinconsistent, it is under constant academic and judicial attack.

97
98

Supra note 15.
See Crann, supra note 22 at 160, noting that "[i]n the final analysis, the

academic debate has revolved around two competing visions of
constitutionalism ... [g]iven such a fundamental normative rift, it is not surprising
that the result of the academic debate is rather indeterminative."
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The critical nature of both the academic critique and judicial
uncertainty is forcing the courts to reconsider issues fundamental to
the Dolphin Delivery decision. That is, despite a decade of
jurisprudence and many attempts to make the law in this area
consistent, it has only become more and more eroded. 9 9 However,
before highlighting the reemergence of this debate, it is useful to
briefly state the current law regarding Charter application:
i) The Charter applies to government; 10o
ii) "Government" actors (ie., not only the core of government but
also delegated authority) are identified by a control test, not by the
function they carry out or whether they appear to be government
entities. The trick is to establish an institutional link to the
Parliament or legislature; 10 1
iii) The Charter does not apply to the private sector where there is
no government presence; 102
iv) The Charter does not apply to judge-made law where this law
regulates the actions between purely private actors, 103 although such
law is to be developed in a manner consistent with the Charter, 104
v) The Charter does apply to the courts but not when the courts are
resolving disputes between private parties. 10 5
This line of Charter development is consistent with classical
liberalism. 106 That is, the Charter may apply in an area we refer to as
99 See Godin, supra note 16 at 109, who writes that "[e]ven in light of the recent
Supreme Court of Canada decisions ... confusion continues as to when and how the
Charter applies to litigation between 'private parties.' It is high time to revisit

Dolphin Delivery . ... "
1oo Dolphin Delivoy, supra note 33.
101 Hogg, supra note 23 at 34-21.
1o2 Dolphin Delivery, supra note 33.
103 Ibid
104 Ibid
105 Dolphin Delivery, supra note 33.
106

For a more sophisticated look at this issue, see Yalden, supra note 73. Yalden
concurs that the Court in Dolphin Delivery embraced the orthodox understanding
of "rights" as a qualified conception of negative liberty. His arguments concerning
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private, but only because the government is there, and it applies
only against the government action. The focus is on the coercive
power of the state. As such, democratic forces determine the scope
of the Charter and, by corollary, they determine the scope of
individual autonomy. Yet, rather than a glowing affirmation of
democracy, this traditional model perpetuates the myth that the
only serious threat to rights and freedoms comes from the
involvement of government in our lives.
In terms of our earlier analysis, one might point out that despite
the lack of logical or historical foundation for this test (ie., the four
pillars), it has been in place for ten years. There is much to be said
in favour of stability and certainty. Yet, recent judicial decisions
would suggest that the law in this area is not only under attack by
academics, but is also collapsing from within. 107
There are two areas which most significantly expose the
weaknesses of the current test. The first is the issue of "legislative
silence." In Vriend (on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada), 108
the Alberta Court of Appeal, divided two to one on the issue of
Charter application, ruled that the legislature's failure to include
sexual orientation in the human rights code was in fact government
action. Hunt J.A., dissenting (in the result but in the majority on
the Charter application issue) wrote,
the purpose of the legislature's failure to protect
homosexuals under the IRPA [Individual's Rights
Protection Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. I-2] is to encourage or
support the distinction that exists between homosexuals
and other victims of discrimination that are protected by
the IRPA. 109

The effect of getting past this threshold (section 32(1)) creates, for
future cases, the potential for the Charter to be used in a more
possible solutions for the courts, in coming to grips with a Canadian vision of
individual and community, are discussed in the following part of the paper.
I07 We are seeing the result of an illogical test built on myths and unconvincing
arguments, as described by Benjamin Cordozo in The Nature ofthe Judicial Process
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921) at 178: "The work of a judge is in one
sense enduring and in another ephemeral. What is good endures. What is erroneous
is pretty sure to perish. The good remains the foundation on which new structures are
built. The bad will be rejected and cast off in the laboratory of the years." [emphasis
added]
108 Supra note 16.
109 Supra note 16 at 641.
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positive manner. Rather than reacting to governmental action in
traditional terms, the Charter could be used to force government to
act (although it must be noted that Vriend failed on the section
15(1) issue).
This is more than a semantic exercise of characterizing silence as
action or non-action. It is a fundamental shift in the nature of
Canadian constitutional law. 110 Dianne Pothier wades into the
argument by criticizing McClung's J. decision (in minority on the
Charter application issue):
[t]he technical answer to that, it seems to me, is that
section 32 does not require a legislature to choose to
exercise authority; it applies to the legislature "in respect
of all matters within the authority of the legislature".
[emphasis added]111

Although a legislature may choose not to occupy the field, this does
not alter the scope of its authority. 112 This principle is analogous to
the exclusivity doctrine in division of powers cases, and is of long
standing in Canadian jurisprudence. For example, in Union Colliery
Co. v. Bryden, [1899] A.C. 580 (P.C.), the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council affirmed that the scope of a government's
authority is not determined by the scope of their legislation.
Rather, powers are exclusive to the particular level of government.

110 In Eldridge, supra note 16, all three judges on the Court of Appeal found the
underinclusiveness of the Medical and Health Care Services Act, S.B.C. 1992, c.76
to be government action, to the extent of not providing services for sign language.
What is surprising is the sparse attention the court paid to the section 32 question.
Leave to appeal was granted on May 9, 1996 by the Supreme Court of Canada.
lll Supra note 16 at 115.
112 Pothier , though, speaks only to situations where there is legislation in an area
and not to a scenario of total absence of legislation. This qualification is an
important rebuttal to those who criticize the positive use of the Charter as having
an anti-democratic sting. Pothier, supra note 16, notes that "[a]lthough there are
specific Charter provisions, such as minority language education rights in section
23, that expressly impose positive obligations on governments, the same could not
easily be said about the Charter in general. In the equality context, however, the
issue is more complex than a dichotomy between positive and negative rights. The
fact that equality is by definition a comparative concept means that governmental
obligations may arise because the government itself has chosen to occupy the field,
but in a less than even-handed way." [footnotes omitted] See the discussion on the
pluralistic nature of the Charter, at text accompanying note 132.
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Therefore, when we speak of "authority," we refer to those things
within legislative competence.
The ambiguous wording of section 32(1) leaves one in doubt as
to whether this doctrine is or is not meant to operate in Charter
litigation. When the drafters chose the words "within the authority
of," they surely were aware of the meaning. Are the words "[t]his
Charter applies" "to the Parliament and government" (or "to the
legislature and government") sufficient to outweigh the use of the
words "within the authority of?" If the intention of the latter was
simply to extend application of the Charter from Parliament (or the
legislature) to delegated authority, they could have written "and all
actors within the authority granted by Parliament."
The point to be noted from the legislative silence cases is that
the courts are themselves moving away from the Dolphin Delivery
and McKinney vision of constitutional law. The effect of
characterizing legislative silence as government action is a
fundamental departure from an orthodox brand of constitutional
theory. The importance of this issue was foreshadowed by Robin
Elliot. He pointed out that accepting the legislative silence
argument would alter the generally well understood negative nature
of constitutional rights. He writes,
[i]f one accepts this premise, then there are no cases in
which, in theory at least, the Charter will not apply,
because counsel for A can always point the finger at
government and attribute responsibility for B's Charter
violation to it. 113

Although accurately identifying the importance of this issue, Elliot
failed to recognize the limitations within the Charter which
preclude such a serious result flowing from a finding that, in some
cases, legislative inaction can properly be characterized as
government action. For example, in Vriend the issue failed on the
section 15 ( 1) test (not to mention that there is an additional section
1 backup). The legislative silence issue will be canvassed further in
Part Four. The salient point at this stage is to be aware that the law
in this area is unsettled, both in the academic and judicial arenas.

113

221.

R. Elliot, "Scope of the Charters Application" (1993) 15 Advocates'

Q. 204 at
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The second area which exposes the weakness of the government
actor test is the issue of applying the Charter to the common law, 114
in cases as between purely private parties. Acceptance of the
Charter's application under such circumstances is a direct
contradiction to the position that the Charter only applies as against
government action (legislative/executive). The most important
declaration in this area came in the Hill case. 11 5
This case involved the application of the common law rule of
libel between purely private parties. The defence argued the right to
freedom of expression (section 2(b)) under the Charter. Yet, the
Court was faced with Dolphin Delivery and McKinney, and the
desire to keep judge-made law, between private parties, away from
Charter litigation. However, hard cases challenge old dogma. In
this instance, the Court had a defendant who faced a limit on free
speech due to the application of the common law rule of libel:
There is no government action involved in this
defamation suit. It now must be determined whether a
change or modification in the law of defamation is
required to make it comply with the underlying values
upon which the Charter is founded. 116

The Court responded to the inevitability that it would have to
develop judge-made law in a manner consistent with the Charter. 11 7

114

See B. C. G.E. U, supra note 64, where the common law power of injunction
was found to violate section 2(b) of the Charter but was upheld by a traditional
section 1 analysis (in the specific context of criminal contempt of court); R. v.
Salituro, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654, where a common law rule of evidence was held to be
inconsistent with Charter values; R. v. Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933, where a
common law criminal procedure rule was found to violate section 7 of the Charter.
A traditional section 1 test was applied, balancing the individual rights to liberty
versus societal interests in prosecuting crime, finding in favour of the individual;
Dagenais, supra note 16, where a common law rule regarding publication bans was
subject to the Charter and again the Court balanced the interest of the individual
versus the purpose of the common law rule. It is important to note that these cases
did not involve the application of the common law berween purely private parties.
11 5 Supra note 16.
116 Supra note 16 at 1164.
117 See generally M. Smith, jurisprudence (Columbia University Press, 1909) at
21, stating that "[t]he common law does not work from pre-established truths of
universal and inflexible validity to conclusions derived from them
deductively ... [t]he rules and principles of case law have never been treated as final
truths, but as working hypotheses, continually retested in the great laboratories of
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The Court attempted to deal with section 52(1) and the
jurisprudential baggage of Dolphin Delivery by semantically
claiming that the Charter did not "apply" to the common law.
Rather the common law had to be developed in a manner
consistent with Charter values. 118 The concern was that the Charter
must not be applied as between private parties. The Court went on
to say:
[t]he Charter represents a restatement of the fundamental
values which guide and shape our democratic society and
our legal system. It follows that it is appropriate for the
courts to make such incremental revisions to the common
law as may be necessary to have it comply with the values
enshrined in the Charter.1 19

Yet, flowing out of this expansionist language, the Court pulled
back, warning that individuals do not owe constitutional duties to
one another. Towards these ends, the Court stated the obvious
point that the Charter (in these circumstances) only operates in
relation to the common law. It is difficult to see how this was much
of a qualification. For example, if what was being challenged was
the Libel and Slander Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L. 12, the issue would be
the same. Specifically, the Charter would be applied against the law
in question (consistent with the orthodox view of
constitutionalism). As such, the only remaining qualification is the
semantic difference in applying Charter rights (statute law) as
opposed to Charter values (common law - private parties).

the law, the courts of justice ... if a rule continues to work injustice, it will
eventually be reformulated."
118 On a practical level it appears as though the Court has decided to follow
United States jurisprudence. In Shelleyv. Kraemer 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the court
held that a voluntarily entered covenant in a deed, prohibiting the sale of land to
people of certain social backgrounds enforced by a lower court, was reviewable state
action. Note, H. Friendly, "The Public-Private Penumbra-Fourteen Years Later"
(1982) 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1289 at 1295, observing that" the action of its courts in
enforcing that rule, that was the unconstitutional state action in Shelley." In New
York Timesv. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254 (1964), (distinguished on other grounds), the
judge-made rules of libel were considered state action. Otis, supra note 72 at 89,
writes "[i]n cases where no human rights legislation is applicable, the Charter can
be used as a persuasive, albeit not conclusive, guide to the requirements of public
policy in contract law or other areas of private law."
119 Hill supra note 16 at 1169.
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The Court went on to engage in a section 1-type balancing act.
The Court recognized, as it does with "government action," the
inevitability of competing values. There was an attempt to phrase
this in terms of Charter values versus the principles which underlie
the common law. In reality, however, the court juxtaposed the
individual right to free speech with the individual interest in
personal reputation. The Court used the word "clash"12o
appropriately, since this was a clash of human values, not Charter
versus common law. Freedom of expression was weighed against
the value of reputation. After balancing these interests, the Court
concluded:
the common law of defamation complies with the
underlying values of the Charter and there is no need to
amend or alter it. 121

The Court, it seems, tried to cast Charter values in a language
which is looser than Charter rights. It did this by pointing out that
the challenge applied only as between the individual and the
common law, and by altering the onus and flexibility in the section
1 balance. Since there was no government presence, the onus
remained on the party challenging the common law. By themselves,
these rulings do not soften the effect of the decision, and it appears
that the Charter does apply as between private parties (with only
minor modifications). 122 Likewise, the difference between Charter
values and Charter rights remains confusing, unless this is just a
recognition of the different burdens and levels of flexibility in
balancing the rights and freedoms of private individuals, as opposed
to a situation where one of the parties is government.
Flowing out of Hill we see the inevitability that "private law,'' in
future cases, will be developed by the Charter. The whole decision
rings of a positive approach to constitutional law; as Cory J. (writing
for the majority) noted,

120 Hill, supra note 16 at 1172.
121 Ibid at 1188.
122 C. Schmitz, "Hill Expands Scope to Challenge Common Law Rules" [11
August 1995] The Lawyers' Weekly 2 at 2, "'The reality of that is that really the
common law does have to apply with the Charter of Rights,' Prof. Hogg said.
While the door is now open to Charter challenges to all manner of common-law
rules in cases not involving government action, 'we don't know quite how that will
work itself out yet,' he said."
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[t]he Charter represents a restatement of the fundamental
values which guide and shape our democratic society and
our legal system. It follows that it is appropriate for the
courts to make such incremental revisions to the common
law as may be necessary to have it comply with the values
enshrined in the Charter.123

If these Charter "values" are different then Charter rights, then we
have a two-tiered system of rights.
What then is the state of the law? If the scope of the Charter is
determined by the presence of some government involvement
(legislative/executive), then individual zones of privacy are
developed where government is not (Hogg' s residual category 12 4).
However:
i) We greatly expand this residual category where we make the
common law subject to Charter scrutiny; and
ii) We potentially obliterate the zone where we use the Charter to
force the government to legislate.
As Paul D. Godin points out in a recent article,
Hill and Dagenais go far toward erasing the unfortunate
public-private distinction that has existed up until now in
Charter jurisprudence.
Courts have restricted the application of the Charter
to the common law in the past largely because of the
perception that the Charter would cause a major upheaval
of the common law. . . . If the gap between the Charter
and the common law is large, evolution of the common
law is needed. If the gap is small, the concern about a
flood of common law Charter litigation is unwarranted.
[footnotes omitted] 125

Where do these recent collapses and attacks leave us? Are we
back where we started ten years ago? Not quite. This time the
Court, in asking whether the Charter should apply only as against

123
124
125

Supra note 16 at 1164.
Hogg, supra note 23 at 34-21.
Supra note 16 at 140-141.
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government, will have the advantage of not relying on old
dogmatic arguments, such as the nature of constitutions.126 It
appears that the government actor test is without foundation and is
inoperative on a practical level. Like it or not, we are right back in
the middle of the debate, and the Supreme Court of Canada has
another crack at this question in the Eldridge and Vriend cases.

IV. WHERE Do WE Go Now?
Before engaging in a search for "solutions," it is important to
establish why the law developed as it has. Throughout all the
uncertainty and semantics, it is still possible to identify a golden
thread running through the case law flowing from the Supreme
Court of Canada on the issue of Charter application. At its most
fundamental level, the Court is engaged in the political issue of
defining and insulating a zone of privacy from Charter litigation.
The jurisprudential primacy given to this desire has led the
Court, early in the life of the Charter, to adopt and apply a general
threshold test for all Charter rights and freedoms (section 32(1)).
The desire has continued to be an impetus for the Court to cling to
the heavily criticized government actor test. In its desire to protect
this vaguely defined zone, the Court has unfortunately rendered
some poor decisions.
For example, the Court's continued assertion that the Charter
does not apply to the common law as between private individuals
led to the distinction in Hill between Charter rights and Charter
values. It appears that this was not grounded in logic or a literal
reading of section 32(1), but was the Court scrambling to balance
section 52(1) with a desire to protect the zone of privacy, 127 a zone
126 See generally R. Devlin, The Charter and Anglophone Legal Theory (Faculty
of Law, Dalhousie University, 1996) [unpublished] at 57, stating that "[i]n sum,
what these various examples of working theory suggest is that contemporary
Canadian jurists believe that legal doctrine matters, but that doctrine is not simply a
matter of rules. Rather, legal doctrine is inevitably dependent upon juridically
significant background assumptions and social visions and that the role of the legal
theorist is to engage in the articulation of these assumptions and visions, to translate
needs and aspirations into juridical form."
127 Hogg, supra note 23 at 34-22, where Hogg raises the concern over allowing
the Charter to apply in purely private actions not governed by statute. "This would
create an extensive new body of' constitutional tort law' .... The Charter of Rights,
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where human activity would be free from Charter attack and
litigation. Those who speak apocalyptically of life without a strict
threshold test, speak of situations where, for example, a homeowner
could not deny strangers entry into his or her home to scream out
political beliefs, since this would be a violation of free expression
under section 2(b). They argue that the only way to protect the
Charter from being used in such a perverse manner is to maintain a
rigid threshold test, in essence, using a negative liberty template to
weed out improper actions.
In defence of the government actor test, it is argued that this is
not about drawing the public/private line, rather it is about applying
the neutral principle of individual versus state. As such, the Charter
is said to only apply against the "government." It is pointed out
that since government is involved in many activities we consider
"private," by corollary the Charter sometimes applies to the private
sector. It is worth pointing out the obvious fact that in these cases,
the Charter still only applies as against government action. So when
speaking of the "zone," the paper is referring to Hogg's "residual
category" 128 in the private or public sectors, where the
democratically elected government has chosen not to go. This is the
area that is outside the scope of the Charter.
This fiction begins to break down, however, when one looks at
the operation of the government actor test in its practical
application. For example, the Court is willing to apply the Charter
to the common law as between private parties (at least by
developing the common law in a manner consistent with the
Charter). 129 Clearly this is within the private sector but is not a
response to legislative action. Nonetheless, the scope of the Charter
is expanded (the shrinking "residual category" must subtract out
the vast areas where the common law applies). In addition, some
courts are characterizing legislative silence as government action. 130
No longer can it be said that the scope of the Charter shadows
legislative/ executive action. This residual category, in terms of
being characterized as a neutral principle, is a fiction. There is a
and judicial review that inescapably accompanies its prescriptions, would be
intolerably pervasive, applying to even the most intimate relationship." [footnote
excluded] Also see Beatty, supra note 85.
128 Hogg, supra note 23 at 34-21.
129 Hill supra note 16.
l30 Eldridge, supra note 16; and Vriend, supra note 16.
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privacy line to be drawn, but this involves a political choice by the
courts.
This is demonstrated in the Hill (common law) and Eldridge
(legislative silence) cases. They are logical decisions which seem to
respond to academic consideration of the issues, as well as unique
and challenging fact situations before the bench. These cases
fundamentally expose the fiction of the government actor test. The
test is not a neutral principle. Because the role of the legislature in
our lives is all pervasive, there are positive expectations on the state
(recognized by Canadian society and certain provisions of the
Charter). Characterizing the present threshold as responding only
to negative liberty is simply not accurate.
Canadian courts are no longer focusing nicely and neatly on
government action. The continued use of a threshold after Hill and
Eldridge can only be the result of the political desire to draw a line
between what is within the zone of privacy and what is not. If the
goal was to create a neutral test which could objectively define
public from private, by focusing on the powers exercised and
delegated by the legislatures, then the Court has failed. In essence it
is already sliding down the slippery slope. On its way down, it is
attempting to draw the public/private line. 131
Why does the threshold test not work? Quite simply, it is
because the Court is asking it to perform a task which is too great in
scope. Canada is a complex society, containing many notions of
liberty. For example, can the traditional individual versus state
brand of liberty be said to spring from the same fountain of liberty
which spawned the welfare state? In addition, we live with a
modern Charter of Rights, which itself has a range of rights and
freedoms which span from negative liberty to positive liberty. It is
apparent that creating consensus on one notion of liberty is
impossible (as well as not being desirable). But when the Court
creates a threshold test, a gatekeeper function for the Charter, it is
doing just that. This relies upon just one vision of liberty. The
confusion seems to be over the fact that the Court is focusing on

l3I See Howse, supra note 58 at 258: "If only by approving the applicability of the
Charter to human rights codes in cases such as Blainey, the Supreme Court has

made the capacity to draw principled public/private distinctions indispensable to
constitutional adjudication. Formalistic distinctions, such as those employed in
Dolphin, do not adequately respond to the task."
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developing a single vision of liberty, which should not be the issue.
The struggle really is over the two competing forces in the Charter
application debate:
i) The desire to give full breadth to all the rights and freedoms
contained in the Charter, versus
ii) The desire to protect a zone of privacy, keeping this free from
Charter litigation/interference.

It is with these two competing forces in mind that both sides in
this debate take up their positions. The following is the
environment this balancing act occurs in.
It has long been recognized that Canada is a pluralistic
society: 132 there is no single vision of liberty. While the classical
liberalism of individual versus state is one of the threads of
Canadian society, it is not the only one. Although this essay is not
an exercise in sociology, some elementary observations can be
made.
First, it can be argued that Canada does not have a pervasively
negative view of government.133 Second, for a very long time,
Canadians have looked to government to get involved in their lives,
accepting government regulation as a way to produce a better
society. This was recognized by E.R. Hopkins in 1939 when he
wrote,
[i] n democratic countries the last fifty years have seen the
attempted working out of a new theory of government
which, while repudiating the various forms of state
idolatry elsewhere prevalent, contemplates the cofunctioning of amelioration and control in part of the
state and self-interested action on the part of the
individual. .. on the positive or enlarging side, it [the
state] seeks to satisfy the essential wants of the many, to

l3Z For example, see Yalden, supra note 73 at 147, arguing that "(b]ecause the
language of rights-a language that places boundaries between the private and the
public or between the individual and society-has always been less rigid in Canada
than in the United States, this emerging vision is much better equipped to move
beyond the artificiality of these barriers than is the language of hard-edged rights, of
rights as trumps .... "
133 Slattery, supra note 82.
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provide facilities whereby the ill effects of poverty,
sickness, old age, crop failure, inadequate housing and
unemployment may be insured against or otherwise
guarded against ... judicial law has not escaped the effects
of this new theory. ... [emphasis added]134
This principle was picked up by Bora Laskin in an article he wrote in
1959 discussing various categories of "liberty" in Canada. 135 Having
spoken of legal and political liberty in the classical sense of
individual versus state, he went on to identify a more recent strand
in Canadian society:
liberty in a human rights or egalitarian sense. Involving as
this has, positive state intervention to secure such things
as equality of employment opportunity or of access to
public places without discrimination... it is, in a sense,
the antithesis of the economic individualism that
deprecated state interference in business or social
relations. 136
The lasting nature of this characterization of Canadian society is
illustrated by Neil Finkelstein's article on "Laskin's Four Classes of
Liberty." 137 His point is that Laskin' s view of egalitarian liberty
called for a more positive governmental presence than for political
and legal liberty. This is important to our analysis because this
fourth category of liberalism actually establishes a positive burden
on the state to act.
What should be taken away from this is that Canada, as a
pluralistic society, has a range of views on liberty. Some of these
cannot be categorized in classical negative terms. Indeed, some of
these view the role of government very positively.
In addition, the Charter similarly casts rights and freedoms
along a spectrum of positive and negative liberties. As Slattery
l34 E. Hopkins, "Administrative Justice in Canada" (1939) 17 Can. Bar Rev. 619
at 626-627.
l35 B. Laskin, "An Inquiry Into the Diefenbaker Bill of Rights" (1959) 37 Can.
Bar Rev. 77. It should be noted that having a positive view of liberty does not
necessarily mean one wants this enforced through the constitution (as opposed to the
political process). This is not to imply that Laskin was in any way giving the
impression that the courts should be used in such a way, especially since this article
was written in the pre-Charter era.
136 Ibid at 81.
l37 N. Finkelstein, "Laskin's Four Classes of Liberty" (1987) Can. Bar Rev. 227.
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points out, the Charter is not rooted in any antagonism toward
government. 138 As noted in the first part of this paper, many
academics are quick to point out that certain sections of the Charter
are written in very positive language. 139 It can be seen that some of
the forces recognized by Laskin are also evident in the Charter.
These are:
Legal:
10. Everyone has the right on arrest or detention ...
11. Any person charged with an offence has the right ...
Political:
3. Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of
members of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly
and to be qualified for membership therein.
Egalitarian:
15 (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and
has the right to the equal protection and benefit of the law without
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on
race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or
physical disability.
The notion that there is more than one stream running through the
Charter is easier to accept when one recalls that this was the product
of political compromise. To brand the Charter a 19th century
document, as some do, 140 simply ignores its history. Taking the
Laskin typology (that this brand of liberty requires state action) one
step further, it can be argued that since egalitarian liberty is
reflected in various sections of the Charter, a court, when applying
these sections, has a positive duty to intervene.

Supra note 82 at 161.
See, e.g., Buckingham, supra note 36; Gibson, supra note 15; Elliot, supra note
113; and Slattery, supra note 82.
140 See e.g. Petter, supra note 11.
138

l39
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This sub-section concludes by highlighting the point that both
Canadian society and the Charter are pluralistic and as such cannot
be pigeonholed into a purely negative theory of liberty. The Court
is still faced with the competing forces of giving full breadth to the
Charter while protecting an individual zone of privacy. It has not
been the intention of this paper to discredit the legitimacy of either
one of these forces. Rather, it has been to show the context in which
both of these must be balanced.
How then should the Court go about creating this balance? As
Parts Two and Three demonstrated, there is nothing inherent in the
Charter which calls for a threshold approach, and it is for that
reason that the current attempt by the Court to apply a threshold is
under attack. 141 This recent round of attack is not simply the result
of setting a threshold in classical liberal terms (missing much of
what Canadian society and the Charter call for). The threshold
approach to determining the scope of the Charter is inherently
flawed, 142 since using a threshold invariably involves setting a level.
The level in this case is a particular brand of liberty. For
example, while expanding section 11 into areas without government
presence would, in most cases, be a mistake (ie., parent/child
disciplinary matters), it is also a mistake to limit equality rights
only as against government since much inequality exists in Hogg's
"residual category." Although human rights legislation covers this
"zone," and this legislation is subject to the Charter, there still must
be a positive approach to Charter litigation for inequalities in the
zone to be covered, since traditionally, the Charter only applies to
action, not inaction. To understand the gap that exists between
Hogg' s residual zone, human rights legislation and a true guarantee
141 See Eldridge, supra note 16. The position argued in this paper might be
criticized as being simplistic, in that the legislation in this case is being treated as the
threshold. However, the legislative silence issue arises since what was being
challenged was the state's failure to provide funding for sign language
interpretation services. In essence, the challenge was to the failure of the
government to provide such services. The Court allowed this to pass section 32(1)
and launched into a section 15(1) analysis.
142 As noted by A. Brownstein, "Constitutional Wish Granting and the Property
Rights Genie" (1996) 13 Constitutional Commentary 7 at 63: "Both arguments,
however, miss an essential point about the nature of rights. The range of interests
recognized and protected as rights by the constitutional case law is too broad and
the nature of those interests is too varied for rights to be protected under any one set
of universal principles."
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of equality, one needs to focus on the difference between Blainey v.
Ontario Hockey Association 143 (permissive legislation allowing
discrimination to occur) and Vriend (failure to include, or "gaps" in
the human rights act) . 144
The problem with the threshold is made more acute when the
Court awkwardly tries to maintain a 19th century brand of
constitutional theory. A similar point is recognized by U.S.
constitutional scholar Lawrence Tribe:
In resolving state action questions, therefore, the Court
has not been able to resort to a unified, affirmative theory
of liberty in order to reconcile the tension between the
premise of the state action requirement, or to decide
when government tolerance of private conduct amounts
to "state action." Not surprisingly, therefore, many of the
Court's recent state action decisions, insofar as they

(1986), 14 0.A.C. 194.
Supra note 16. But see Haig and Birch v. The Queen in Right of Canada et al.
(1992), 9 O.R. (3d) 495 (C.A.) [hereinafter Haig]; and D. Pothier, "Charter
Challenges to Underinclusive Legislation: The Complexities of Sins of Omission"
(1993-94) 19 Queens's L.J. 161 at 180-81: "How did the Court in Haig, specifically
involving the failure to include sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of
discrimination in the Canadian Human Rights Act, deal with ... [s.32(1)). Both the
Ontario High Court and the Court of Appeal avoided the issue entirely, and
proceeded to find and remedy a s.15 violation. Was this a failure to recognize the
issue, or a deliberate strategy of avoidance, hoping that a thorny issue would just go
away if ignored? It is difficult to say but sooner or later the issue will need to be
confronted head-on." [footnotes excluded] Yet, "head-on" involves a recognition of
positive liberty.
For an example of this "head-on" approach, see Taylorv. Rossu, [1996) A.J. No.
918 (Q.B.)(Q.L.), where Power J. writes,
143
144

The fact that the Alberta Legislature has omitted common law
spouses in the Domestic Relations Act is sufficient to engage the
Charter ... I agree with the approach of Hunt J .A. m
Vriend . .. where she states:
A third approach is that legislatures cannot avoid a
s.15(1) analysis merely because they have failed to
extend a protection or benefit to a particular group. In
other words, a failure to legislate, (or legislative silence
or omission), can of itself attract Charter scrutiny.
. . .The exclusion of common law spouses from the meaning of the word
"spouse" is not a reasonable limit and is not justified in a free and democratic
society."
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purport to articulate and apply an autonomous state
action doctrine, appear peculiarly unpersuasive.

If we accept the fact that we cannot, with a threshold test, balance
the competing forces of giving full breadth to the Charter with
protecting a zone of privacy, do we give up on the idea of limiting
the scope of the Charter? Not necessarily. We can develop limits in
a manner which is consistent with the Canadian legal tradition of
gradual change. As noted by Crann, "[post-liberal theory] ... must
be capable of taking root in existing Canadian legal traditions and,
at the same time transcending them." 14 5
This can be done by taking a rights-based approach to
determining the scope of the Charter. 146 For example, determining
the scope of egalitarian liberty should be done in the context of
section 15, and not by setting a threshold at a level more
appropriate for section 11. It is possible to allow these competing
streams to develop, by adopting a flexible approach. This will give
the court the opportunity to carefully construct this modern vision
of liberty on a case by case, right by right, basis.
A rights-based approach will not produce one acceptable global
theory ofliberty. 14 7 However, it will allow the Court to develop the
Charter to its full breadth while operating in a manner consistent
with Canadian legal history.
1. The Eldridge Example

The rights-based approach has been adopted by many Canadian
academics. 148 The recent decision of the British Columbia Court of

Supra note 22 at 171.
Brownstein, supra note 142 at 54, stating that "ultimately, the only truly
universal principle that applies to all constitutional rights is the need to define and
defend the protection provided the right on its own terms."
147 C. Stone, "Corporate Vices and Corporate Virtues: Do Public/Private
Distinctions Matter?" (1982) U. Pa. L. Rev. 1441at1442, noting that "there is not
so much one 'public/private' dichotomy as several."
148 For example, Slattery, supra note 82 at 154, says, "[i]n short, no uniform
answer can be given to the question whether the Charter regulates private relations.
All that can be said is that the Charter does not contain a general rule exempting
them from its effects. The true issue, then, is not whether Charter rights en bloc
affect such relations but whether specific Charter rights do so ... the argument
should be addressed to the particular provision in question, and not to the abstract
(and ultimately unanswerable) issue of the Charter's scope as a whole."
145
146
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Appeal in Eldridge (on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada) is
an example of this approach. This case involved a challenge to the
Hospital Insurance Act1 49 and the Medical and Health Care Services
Act15° of British Columbia. The applicants were deaf patients who
challenged the acts under section 15 (1) of the Charter. The basis for
this was the absence of funding for sign language interpretation
services. Essentially the challenge was to legislative silence, or failure
of the government (legislature and hospital) to provide such
services, while hearing patients were able to receive full medical
servICes.
Hollinrake J.A. (Cumming J.A. concurring) discussed how the
Charter did not apply to the hospital, since the facts were on all
fours with Stoffinan v. Vancouver General Hospital. 151 However, with
regard to the benefit of the law challenge against the Medical and
Health Care Services Act, there was no discussion of the section
32(1) issue and no threshold, in a sense. The Court launched
immediately into the section 15(1) analysis. Perhaps not by design,
but in effect, this was a rights-based approach (although finding no
right in the section 15(1) analysis).
It is important to recognize that the Court was able to define
the scope of the Charter within the section 15(1) analysis. The
rights-based approach gave the Court greater flexibility in its
analysis:
In my opinion the submissions of the appellants would
take us beyond anything yet provided for in existing
equality rights jurisprudence. They submit that s.15 be
interpreted in such a manner as to effectively impose on
the government a positive duty to address all inequalities
when legislating benefits in the area of medical services.
That, in my opinion, is equivalent to imposing an
obligation on the government of ensuring absolute
equality. With respect, for the reasons given above, I do
not think that s.15 imposes such an obligation. 152

The Court talks about positive rights (although rejecting them on
section 15(1) grounds) and interference with the democratic
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process. The important point is that, although there was, in effect,
no section 32(1) threshold, the floodgates did not open. 153 Rightly
or wrongly (in terms of defining the section 15 (1) liberty in
question 154 ), they developed the Charter application/scope analysis
at the level of the right in question.
Further to this is the decision of Lambert J.A. (concurring in the
result) who did not discuss section 32(1) at all! Lambert went
directly into section 15(1) and found a prima facie violation. In the
section 1 analysis there was considerable discussion of budgetary
constraints on government, judicial inability to allocate scarce
resources, and a general tone of judicial restraint.
This highlights the fidelity of the rights-based approach. The
simple fact is that in addition to limiting the scope of the Charter at
the level of the right in question, there is also the section 1 back up,
where issues relating to democratic government are more
appropriately discussed. This is a backstop for those concerned
about judicial encroachment on the democratic process, a
constitutionally created mechanism for balancing the interests of
society with those of the individual.
This case shows the potential benefit of a rights-based analysis,
which allows the court to fashion liberty in a flexible manner, on an
individual basis, without choking the pluralistic range of rights and
freedoms in the Charter. This is the best way to balance the two
competing streams. Perhaps the British Columbia Court of Appeal
started us down the road to what Robert Yalden asked of the
Supreme Court of Canada:
The challenge that our courts face, and that some justices
of Canada's Supreme Court have sought to meet, is to
explore the non-paternalistic form of positive liberty, to
make use of a distinctly Canadian language of rights to
overcome an unduly rigid distinction between public and

!53 Another element which will prevent a flood of litigants is the nature of the
litigation process itself. For example, in the Vriend case, supra note 16, Delwin
Vriend was fired in January 1991 and the Alberta Human Rights Commission
made its decision in June 1991. The Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta came to its
decision in 1994. The Alberta Court of Appeal came to its decision in February
1996. This is not an environment which encourages individuals to start frivolous
actions.
154 For a critique of the Court's decision in relation to the section 15(1) issue, see
Pothier, supra note 16.
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private spheres, and yet remain true to the orthodox
vision's most profound insight: that is, the importance of
enabling individuals to lead dignified and rewarding
lives, of enabling them to pursue their own good in their
own way. 155
It is interesting that this approach occurred in a case which
failed on the section 15 ( 1) issue. The lack of a threshold test did
not give way to an activist court. The new approach to Charter
application may not produce consensus on liberty, but it will
provide the court a better environment and opportunity to fashion
the various streams of liberty, on a case by case basis.

V. THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXAMPLE
With the plethora of Canadian and U.S. cases on this subject it may
seem strange that the paper now shifts its focus to the South African
context. However, the recent case of De Klerk v. Du Plessis1 56 from
the South African Constitutional Court exposes and highlights
many of the same arguments which have occurred in Canada over
the last ten years. This case is particularly applicable to the
Canadian context, since the Court itself relies heavily on Canadian
and U.S. experiences.
Specifically however, this case is being used because it reflects
the utility in approaching the issue of Charter application in the
manner suggested in this paper. That is, the task is to recognize that
the engine of the application debate is politics, that the test
developed by the Court is analytically separate from the reasons for
creating and applying the test, and, when one unpacks the various
"reasons" and analyses them individually, it becomes apparent that
these do not breed consensus. The point is that these arguments are
insufficient ground on which to build jurisprudence. The focus of
analysis should be on producing the best test, one which serves the
desire to give full breadth to the constitution while protecting a
zone of privacy, rather than adhering to vague, dogmatic
recollections of a history which never happened or a theory of
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constitutionalism which did not exist at the time our Charter was
drafted.
The facts of De Klerk involve the application of the common
law doctrine of defamation. The defendants to the action were the
editor, owner, journalist and distributor of a newspaper called the
Pretoria. The plaintiffs Gert de Klerk and Wonder Air Limited
were suing the defendants as a result of articles written in the
Pretoria. The defence tried to rely on the Constitution. The trial
judge, Van Dijkhorst, transferred the matter to the Constitutional
Court on two grounds. Only the second ground involved the
determination of the scope of application of constitutional rights
and freedoms. 157
With respect to the second ground of the reference, it is
possible to summarize the seven written decisions into two
competing streams. The first is given by Kentridge J. and concurred
with in the result by Chaskalson P., Langa J., O'Reagan J.,
Mahomed DP., Ackermann J., Makgoro J., and Sachs J. This
approach is consistent with Dolphin Delivery and Hill. Specifically,
the Court applied the constitution to this dispute (common law as
between two private parties) but only "indirectly." 158 The other line
of decision is given by Kriegler J. and concurred in result by
Didcott J. (and partially in result by Madala J.), finding for a direct
application 159 of the constitution to the common law (as between
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De Klerk, supra note 156. The trial judge used the terms vertical and
horizontal to summarize the nature of the debate. Kentridge AJ. picked up on this
and defined the terms as follows: "The term 'vertical application' is used to indicate
that the rights conferred on persons by a Bill of Rights are intended only as a
protection against the legislative and executive power of the state in its various
manifestations. The term 'horizontal application' on the other hand indicates that
those rights also govern the relationship between individuals, and may be invoked
by them in their private law disputes."
158 De Klerk, supra note 156. Kentridge AJ. explains the indirect application
principle in the following terms, saying that it "does not have a general direct
horizontal application bur that it may and should have an influence on the
development of the common law as it governs relations between individuals." There
is also a strong emphasis on the incremental nature of such change in the common
law, nothing akin to striking down the law.
l59 Ibid. Madala J. explains the direct application of the Constitution to the
common law in the following way: "In my view, it is the task of the Supreme Court
to oversee this development. The law is always changing. The Supreme Court has
always participated on an active basis in the adjudication of the common law rules.
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private parties). It is interesting, and consistent with the Canadian
experience, that the various sides to the "big picture" debate
(indirect versus direct application) have different views on the
democratic process. For example, Sachs J. (indirect camp), writes:
[h]ow best to achieve the realization of the values
articulated by the Constitution, is something far better
left in the hands of those elected by and accountable to
the general public, than placed in the lap of the courts. l60

This faith in the democratic system's ability to effect change and to
be the engine for a new and better South Africa is not shared by
Madala J. (direct camp, concurring in part with Kriegler J.):
Ours is a multiracial, multicultural, multilingual society
in which the ravages of apartheid, disadvantage and
inequality are just immeasurable .... In its effort to
create a new order, our Constitution must have been
intended to address these oppressive and undemocratic
practices at all levels. l61

As in the Canadian context, these underlying beliefs (about the
democratic process) are the undercurrent to the analysis. That is,
arguments on history, text, etc., flow from conclusions already
formed concerning desired forms of government.
Although not written in such a circular fashion, these
judgments, in effect, approach the traditional arguments from these
conclusions. The paper will now analyze the arguments made to
support the conclusions drawn on the vertical/horizontal issue. The
point of this comparative exercise is to point out the lack of solid
ground in these traditional grounds.
1. Historical Arguments

Those in the indirect camp argue, to varying degrees, the historical
record. For instance, Kentridge J. (Chaskalson J., Langa J., and
O'Reagan J. concurring) argue that there is no history calling for a
horizontal application. 162 In the same camp, Ackerman J. and Sachs
What is now required of it is that in disputes between private individuals it should
balance their competing rights as envisaged in the Constitution." This approach
does not call for incrementalism or a softer version of judicial review.
160
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J. more strongly rely on the historical record to conclude that the
constitutional history clearly precludes a horizontal application. For
example, Ackerman J., states "[d]irect application ... could not
have been intended by the drafters." 163
Out of the direct application camp, a polar opposite conclusion
is drawn from the "historical analysis." Kriegler ]. notes that the
intent of those who created the Constitution must have been such
that they were "familiar with the stark reality of South Africa and
the power relationships .... " He concluded that their intent was
never to limit the Constitution to vertical application.
2. Textual Arguments

The recurring pattern of inductive analysis continues here with
judges drawing opposite conclusions on the "clear meaning" of the
text. For the indirect camp, the position (except for Mohomed
DP.) can be summed up by Ackermann J.:
For the reasons given by Kentridge AJ in his judgment
and those advanced above, the text of the Constitution,
properly construed, strongly favours the conclusion that
the direct horizontal application of Chapter 3 to private
legal relations is not intended. 164

Kentridge AJ. argues that the lack of clear wording, to the effect
that the Constitution applies horizontally, means that it was not
intended to do so: "Had the intention been to give it a more
extended application that could have been readily expressed." 165
Meanwhile, Kriegler J. argues that had the intent been to exclude
horizontal application, it should have been made explicit: "It is
common cause that it nowhere says that Chapter 3 governs only the
relationship between the state and the individual." 166 He goes on to
say, "[i] f indeed the drafters had such a major constraint in mind,
why did they not say so? Instead they wax expansive, leaving it to
the microscope of a 'verticalist' to pick up hidden dues." 167 Kriegler
]. draws the opposite conclusion from Ackermann ]. in the textual
analysis:
163
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My reading of Chapter 3 gives to the Constitution a
simple integrity. It says what it means and means what it
says .... The fine line drawn by the Canadian Supreme
Court in the Dolphin Delivery case ... between private
relationships involving organs of state and those which do
not, have no place in our constitutional jurisprudence. 168

The Court is clearly flip-flopping on the "clear meaning" of the
text.
3. Nature of Constitutions

Not surprisingly, both sides stick to their positions in the "nature of
constitutions" argument. Kentridge J., for example, states,
"[e]ntrenched Bills of Rights are ordinarily intended to protect the
subject against legislative and executive action .... " On the other
hand, Kriegler J. and Madala J. put far less weight on comparative
analysis and vague notions of the proper role of a constitution.

4. Floodgates
The Kentridge J. group, arguing for indirect application, is quick to
sound the floodgate alarm. Kentridge warns of a widely expanded
role for the courts, 16 9 and Sachs J. warns of the serious effect this
would have in terms of hamstringing the legislature. The
inconclusive nature of this argument is attacked by Kriegler J.:
The second point concerns a pervading misconception
held by some and, I suspect, an egregious caricature
propagated by others. That is that socalled direct
horizontality will result in an Orwellian society in which
the all powerful state will control all private relationships.
The tentacles of government will, so it is said, reach into
the marketplace, the home, the very bedroom .... That is
nonsense . . . . I use strong language designedly. The
caricature is pernicious, it is calculated to inflame public
sentiments and to cloud people's perceptions of our
fledgling constitutional democracy. 170

168
169
170

De Klerk, supra note 156.
Ibid.
Ibid.

234

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

The paper has purposely excluded the text of the South African
Constitution because it is the contention of the author that the text
is less controlling than the suppositions one brings to the analysis.

VI. CONCLUSION
The approach which is most interesting and consistent with what
this paper is proposing is that of Madala J. in De Klerk. This
judgment goes further than arguing against the traditional grounds
for a vertical application of the Constitution. Madala's judgment
can serve as a model for the type of analysis which should occur at
the Supreme Court of Canada.
To begin with, in challenging the orthodox approach of
constitutionalism, Judge Madala points out that both the South
African Constitution and South African society are pluralistic. The
point is that some elements of the constitution call for vertical
application while others call for horizontal:
Those who would widen the scope of the operation of the
Bill of Rights hold the view that the verticality approach
is unmindful of the modern day reality that in many
instances the abuse in the exercise of power is perpetrated
less by the State and more by private individuals against
other private individuals. 17 1

He adopts the methodology of the rights-based approach. It is
interesting to note that Madala J. held that Chapter 15 of their
Constitution was limited to indirect application while Chapter 3
would be applied directly.
Although this essay is not one which purports to be a
comparative exercise, it is useful to employ the u.s. and South
African contexts as signposts. They help reinforce the point that the
fundamental nature of constitutional rights and freedoms is
political. Producing consensus on the political issue of liberty is
difficult. Further, the attempt to produce consensus through the
use of a threshold test (ie., one vision of liberty) when both the
Charter and Canadian society are pluralistic, is an exercise in
futility. We see over a hundred years of doctrinal confusion in the
u.s. and a seriously fractured court in South Africa. The Supreme
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Court of Canada has the opportunity in Eldridge and Vriend to
change the state of the law regarding Charter application.
If the Court is going to take advantage of this opportunity, it
will have to develop a judicial method distinct from Dolphin,
McKinney, and Hill. The Court will have to re-address the four
pillars objectively, reflect on the fractured jurisprudence, and try to
come up with an approach which will be able to produce some
certainty and uniformity in the law. It is hoped that this paper has
made clear that there are two legitimate and to some extent
competing streams involved in this:
i) The desire to give full breadth to all the rights and freedoms
contained in the Charter,
ii) The desire to protect a zone of privacy, keeping this zone free
from Charter litigation/interference.

If the Court sticks to a threshold approach, it will not be able to
balance these two forces. Through semantics, the Court may be
able to bolster the second branch but this will certainly be at the
expense of the first. The Court should follow the lead of the British
Columbia Court of Appeal and reject the threshold approach in
favour of a rights-based approach. Developing competing forces of
liberty in a complex society is a daunting task. However it is one
the Supreme Court must accept, and the best it can do is to
develop, through the rights-based test, a methodology which
provides it with the greatest opportunity for success.

